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PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN: SOLVING THE
COMPETENCY DILEMMA BY BROADENING THE CONCEPT
OF RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING IN COMPETENCY-TO-BEEXECUTED DETERMINATIONS
Gary R. Studen ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fifty-three individuals were executed in the United States in
1
2006, placing the United States sixth on a list of total number of
2
known executions carried out by a country that year. Although this
country’s criminal justice system protects a person who is incompe3
4
5
tent from standing trial and from being held criminally liable,
there is a growing concern among legal and mental health organizations over the lack of a clear standard to be used in determining
6
whether a prisoner is mentally competent to be executed. A pris∗

J.D. Candidate, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, University of Maryland. The author would like to thank Professor John Wefing for his invaluable assistance in writing this Comment.
1
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., EXECUTIONS BY YEAR (2008), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=&&did= 146.
2
Amnesty International USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang
=e&id=ENGACT500122007 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
3
References to “competence” in this Comment are understood to refer to a prisoner’s mental state, separate and aside from the issue of mental retardation. This
term is also synonymous with “insanity” in this context. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002). Competence along the lines of insanity does not necessarily result in
diminished intelligence, as is the case with mental retardation. Ronald S. Honberg,
The Injustice of Imposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2005).
4
See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (“[T]he standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”) (citing
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1962) (per curiam)).
5
See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 577 (1994) (noting that an insanity
defense enables a jury to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity).
6
Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Consider Impact of Mental Illness on Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at A12.

163

STUDEN (FINAL)

164

1/26/2009 12:32:41 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:163

oner may be deemed competent upon entering death row, but, due
7
to factors such as death row syndrome, a death row inmate’s mental
state can gradually deteriorate.
8
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who is mentally incapable of understanding the reason for the individual’s im9
pending execution. However, the majority failed to specify either a
precise legal test for determining whether a prisoner is competent to
be executed or the proper procedures for an evidentiary hearing on
10
the inmate’s competency. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell
outlined a standard for determining an inmate’s competency to be
executed, stating “that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
11
suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Justice Powell’s competency
test became the constitutional benchmark for courts to interpret and
12
13
implement. Until Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court had
not analyzed whether Justice Powell’s competency standard requires
that an inmate simply be “aware” of the factual predicate for the inmate’s execution or that an inmate also “rationally understand” the
14
connection between the crime and the execution.
This Comment examines the recent decision in Panetti and its effect on the constitutional standard for determining an inmate’s competency to be executed. Although the Court rejected the competency test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
15
Fifth Circuit and held that an inmate must rationally, as well as fac7

The term “death row syndrome” achieved notoriety in a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439,
474–77 (1989). The term refers to the extreme psychological stress an inmate faces
due to several factors, such as length of time and living conditions on death row. Id.
at 474–75.
8
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
9
Id. at 410.
10
Kimberley S. Ackerson et al., Judges’ and Psychologists’ Assessments of Legal and
Clinical Factors in Competence for Execution, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 164, 167 (2005).
11
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
12
Amir Vonsover, Comment, No Reason for Exemption: Singleton v. Norris and Involuntary Medication of Mentally Ill Capital Murderers for the Purpose of Execution, 7 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 311, 316 (2004).
13
127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
14
Tim Birnbaum, Legal Information Institute, Panetti v. Quarterman (06-6407),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06-6407.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
15
The Fifth Circuit test deemed a prisoner’s rational understanding of the connection between the prisoner’s crime and execution irrelevant to whether the prisoner was competent under Justice Powell’s test in Ford. See Panetti v. Dretke, 448

STUDEN (FINAL)

2009]

1/26/2009 12:32:41 PM

165

COMMENT
16

tually, understand the reasons for the prisoner’s execution, the
Court declined to articulate a proper test for competency determina17
tions. Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of the
prohibition against executing the mentally incompetent, briefly recounting both ethical and moral considerations as well as case history. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford and that
decision’s impact on both the procedural and substantive aspects of
competency determinations from a constitutional perspective. Part
IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti. Part V discusses
the ramifications of Panetti, including its broadening of the substantive Ford competency test. Finally, Part VI suggests that courts look to
other areas of competency law which discuss the issue of rationality in
order to craft a proper test for competency-to-be-executed determinations.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
18
EXECUTING THE INCOMPETENT
The prohibition against executing the mentally incompetent
19
dates back to about the thirteenth century. William Blackstone discussed the common law rule and stated that “if a man in his sound
memory commits a capital offence . . . and if after judgment he be20
comes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed.” There are
five historical justifications for the prohibition against executing the
21
22
mentally incompetent: (1) that it offends humanity, (2) that it con23
tributes little to the goal of deterrence, (3) that it is contrary to reli24
25
gious beliefs, (4) that insanity is a punishment in itself, and (5)

F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Justice Powell did not state that a prisoner must ‘rationally understand’ the reason for his execution, only that he must be ‘aware’ of
it.”).
16
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
17
Id.
18
The Eighth Amendment was not incorporated into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment until 1947. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
19
See Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently
Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (1980) (noting that the prohibition against
executing the mentally incompetent dates back to medieval times).
20
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *24 (1979).
21
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1986).
22
Id. at 407.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 407–08.
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that retribution is not served because executing an incompetent in26
mate is unequal in moral value to the inmate’s crime.
Prior to the decision in Ford, the Supreme Court consistently declined to address the constitutionality of executing the mentally in27
competent. In 1897, the Court decided Nobles v. Georgia, in which
the defendant claimed after sentencing that her insanity precluded
28
her from being executed. The Court disposed of the case on procedural grounds and held that a sentenced defendant who claims insanity does not have a right to a competency determination before a
court and a jury; rather, the state legislature has the power to determine whether and how to implement procedures for such a determi29
nation.
30
In 1948, in Phyle v. Duffy, the Court faced two questions: (1)
whether it was constitutional to execute an insane inmate, and (2)
whether a state doctor could make an ex parte decision that an individual was sane to be executed even though the inmate was already
31
declared insane after the conviction. The Court declined to rule on
the first question, stating that the petitioner had not exhausted state
32
remedies. As to the second question, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state
from allowing an ex parte determination that an inmate is sane to be
executed without some method for the inmate to challenge the de33
termination.
34
The 1950 case of Solesbee v. Balkcom provided the Court with
another opportunity to address the constitutionality of executing the
insane. The Court once again declined to address this issue on the
grounds that the narrow question before the Court was whether
Georgia violated an inmate’s due process rights by allowing the gov35
ernor to ultimately decide an inmate’s sanity. The Court held that
the prisoner’s due process rights were not violated by entrusting the
36
governor with this power.

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 408.
168 U.S. 398 (1897).
Id.
Id. at 409.
334 U.S. 431 (1948).
Id. at 433–34, 439–40.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 437.
339 U.S. 9 (1950).
Id. at 12.
Id.
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In 1986, when Ford was decided, twenty-six states expressly prohibited the execution of the mentally incompetent by statute, and
37
these states had a legal test governing competency determinations.
Other states adopted the prohibition against executing the mentally
38
incompetent through judicial decisions.
III. FORD V. WAINWRIGHT

39

A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1974, Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to
40
death without any indication that he might be incompetent. Ford
began to exhibit delusional behavior in 1982, believing that the Ku
Klux Klan had a conspiracy to force him to commit suicide and believing that prison officials were holding his family members hostage
41
42
inside the prison. Under a Florida statute, Ford requested a competency hearing to determine whether he had “the mental capacity to
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it
43
was imposed upon him.” Three psychiatrists met with Ford, and all
of them determined that Ford was competent to be executed under
44
Florida law, despite varying individual diagnoses. Ford attempted to
submit psychiatric evaluations conducted by two other psychiatrists,
but the Governor of Florida signed Ford’s death warrant without any
explanation of his decision or indication of whether Ford’s evidence
45
was considered.
Ford eventually filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seek46
ing an evidentiary hearing on his competency.
After the district
court denied the writ and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine two issues: (1) whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of the mentally incompetent, and (2) if so, what consti-

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 n.2 (1987).
Id.
477 U.S. 399 (1987).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 403–04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 922.07(2) (1985)).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404, 413.
Id. at 404.
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tutional procedures are guaranteed to an inmate who challenges his
47
competency.
B. Court’s Reasoning
1.

Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition on Executing the
Mentally Incompetent

With Justice Marshall writing for the majority, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally
48
incompetent.
Justice Marshall began by noting that the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had developed to encompass both
substantive and procedural requirements regarding the infliction of
49
the death penalty. Justice Marshall articulated the Court’s modern
approach to the Eighth Amendment and stated that “the [Eighth]
Amendment . . . recognizes ‘the evolving standards of decency that
50
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”
After discussing the common law’s prohibition against executing
51
the mentally incompetent, the Court noted that the common law
52
tradition is still in effect in every state. Justice Marshall reinforced
the common law’s justifications against executing the mentally in53
competent and concluded, “Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
54
Amendment.”
2.

Procedures for Competency Determinations

55

Having decided that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally incompetent, the Court then addressed the
due process procedures guaranteed to an inmate who challenges his
competency to face execution. Justice Marshall made it clear that
47

Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 410.
49
Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
50
Id. at 406 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
51
See infra Part II; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 406–08.
52
Ford, 477 U.S. at 408.
53
See infra Part II.
54
Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
55
There was no majority with respect to the constitutional procedures guaranteed to an inmate who challenges his competency to face execution. See id. at 401
(noting that there was no majority for the portion of Justice Marshall’s opinion discussing the required constitutional procedures).
48
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even a condemned inmate is protected by the Constitution and
stated, “Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same
presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or
sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution alto56
gether . . . .”
Florida law required that an inmate who challenged his competency to be executed be evaluated by three psychiatrists at the same
57
time. The governor then made a determination, based on the psychiatric reports, whether the prisoner was competent to face execu58
tion. The governor’s policy prevented the inmate’s counsel from
59
The entire
participating in the competency evaluation process.
competency determination process occurred within the executive
60
branch of the state government.
The plurality indicated that Ford received the protections pro61
vided by Florida’s statutory procedures. However, Justice Marshall
concluded that Florida failed to advance even its minimal constitutional interest in ensuring that mentally incompetent inmates are not
executed due to several flaws in Florida’s competency determination
62
process. The first flaw in Florida’s process, according to Justice Mar63
shall, was that the inmate has no input in the determination. The
plurality articulated that any process regarding the decision of
whether to execute another human is inadequate if it fails to incorporate all relevant information, including the presentation of rele64
vant information by the inmate.
Justice Marshall stated that a second flaw in Florida’s process was
that the inmate has no ability to question the state-appointed psychia65
trists. The plurality doubted the ability of a factfinder to weigh the
various psychiatric opinions without any questioning of the experts in
order to evaluate the experts’ methods, conclusions, and potential
66
biases. The “most striking defect” in Florida’s competency determination process, according to Justice Marshall, was that the entire

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 411 (plurality opinion).
FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id.
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process was confined within the executive branch. Justice Marshall
was troubled by the fact that the governor, who commands the state’s
prosecutors, is in charge of making a determination in which the
68
governor has had a vested interest since the inmate’s arrest.
The plurality refuted the idea of “a full trial on the issue of san69
ity.”
Justice Marshall declined to articulate the necessary procedures to ensure the states adequately enforce their interest in prohib70
iting the execution of the mentally incompetent.
3.

Justice Powell’s Concurrence

71

Although the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of the mentally incompetent, the majority did not articulate a proper test for courts to employ to determine whether an
inmate is mentally incompetent, and there was only a plurality with
respect to the constitutional procedures owed to an inmate who
makes a competency challenge. As a result, Justice Powell attempted
to provide some guidance for courts in making competency determinations. Justice Powell articulated that the Eighth Amendment, at a
minimum, prohibits the execution of inmates “who are unaware of
the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer
72
it.” According to Justice Powell, this standard satisfies the retributive goal of criminal law by requiring that an inmate understand the
connection between the crime and punishment in order to face exe73
cution.
In terms of the proper procedures guaranteed to inmates who
challenge their competency to be executed, Justice Powell expressed
his dissatisfaction with the plurality’s “formal” competency determi74
nation process. Justice Powell noted that “[d]ue process is a flexible
75
This fairness, acconcept” grounded in “fundamental fairness.”
cording to Justice Powell, requires that an inmate have an opportu67

Id. at 416.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17.
71
Because there is only a plurality as to the minimum state procedures necessary
in the context of competency determinations to ensure a prisoner is given due process, Justice Powell’s narrow holding controls on this issue. See Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (noting that the narrowest grounds of a concurrence controls when “no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices”).
72
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 427.
75
Id. at 424–25.
68
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nity to challenge the state-appointed psychiatrists’ findings and sub76
mit contrary medical evidence. Justice Powell summarized his conception of the requirements necessary to satisfy due process:
[A] constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal
than a trial. The State should provide an impartial officer or
board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may
differ from the State’s own psychiatric examination. Beyond these
basic requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to
determine what process best balances the various interests at
stake. As long as basic fairness is observed, I would find due proc77
ess satisfied . . . .

C. Effects of Ford on Inmate Competency Determinations
1.

Substantive Competency Test

Justice Powell’s test for determining an inmate’s competency to
78
be executed essentially mirrors the common law prohibition, and
79
the test has been adopted by the Supreme Court. However, Justice
Powell noted that his test for mental competence represented only
the constitutional minimum guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment,
80
which left states free to create a more “expansive view of sanity.”
a.

Single-Prong Test

A majority of states adopted Justice Powell’s standard, which is
81
commonly referred to as the “cognitive” or “single-prong” test. The
82
single-prong test focuses on the inmate’s cognitive ability. An inmate is deemed competent to be executed under this test if the inmate is aware of the impending execution and knows the reasons for
83
This test narrowly construes the definition of
the punishment.
competence by not considering factors, such as mental delusions,
76

Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
78
Bruce Ebert, Competency to Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an Inmate’s Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the Execution of the Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 34–35 (2001).
79
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
80
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
81
Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against the Infliction of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 134–35 (1994).
82
Id. at 135.
83
Id.
77
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that would allow the factfinder to better assess the inmate’s mental
84
state at the time of the competency challenge.
The restrictive nature of the single-prong test is illustrated in the
85
case of Baird v. State. In Baird, the defendant knew that he was going to be executed for killing his wife and parents, but the defendant
claimed that he did not intellectually or emotionally comprehend
86
The Supreme Court
that he was going to die for the murders.
noted that Baird may have a mental disorder, characterized by a be87
lief that “God will turn back time to before the murders.” However,
the court concluded that Baird was competent to be executed, within
the meaning of Justice Powell’s definition of competency articulated
in Ford, because Baird knew that he was going to die for the mur88
ders. As demonstrated, the single-prong test prohibits the consideration of mental delusions in determining an inmate’s competency
to be executed.
b.

Double-Prong Test

The double-prong test is the standard adopted by the American
89
Bar Association (ABA). This test is composed of two independent
prongs and prohibits the execution of an inmate if the inmate meets
either the single-prong test, as formulated by Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford, or what is known as the “ability-to-assist-counsel
90
prong.” The double-prong test is more favorable to prisoners because the test allows an inmate to proffer evidence regarding the in84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
833 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 2005).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
See Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 169. The double-prong test is stated as fol-

lows:
(a) Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be executed
if they are currently mentally incompetent. If it is determined that a
condemned convict is currently mentally incompetent, execution
should be stayed.
(b) A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature
of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason
for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also
incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the
convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact
which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or the
court.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD § 7-5.6 at 290 (1987).
90
Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 168–69.
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mate’s rational understanding of the punishment or the inmate’s
ability to offer exculpatory or mitigating evidence as opposed to sim91
ply being limited to the more stringent single-prong test.
92
In Singleton v. State, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
adopted a slightly modified version of the ABA’s double-prong test
93
for determining an inmate’s competency to be executed. The court
stated that South Carolina’s adaptation of the ABA’s ability-to-assistcounsel prong allows an inmate to offer evidence regarding the in94
mate’s ability to rationally communicate with counsel. The court
concluded that Singleton was incompetent to be executed under the
ability-to-assist-counsel prong of South Carolina’s double-prong test
because Singleton was “incapable of rational communication” due to
95
his inability to properly respond to his counsel’s questions. Singleton
demonstrates the prisoner-friendly nature of the double-prong test
because the test allows courts to better assess an inmate’s rational
comprehension of the crime, punishment, and proceedings.
2.

Procedures for Competency Determinations

Ford did little to establish even the most basic procedures necessary for competency determinations in order to ensure compliance
96
with due process requirements. From a purely precedential standpoint, there was no majority on the issue of procedure. Whereas Justice Marshall outlined the plurality’s perception of the relevant flaws
97
in Florida’s process, Justice Powell advocated a more flexible ap-

91

See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD, Commentary §7-5.6 at
291 (1987) (noting that the double-prong test “reflect[s] the substantive concern
that individuals should not be executed while they lack the capacity for rational understanding of the nature of the proceedings or of the penalty that is about to be
imposed”).
92
437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
93
Id. at 58.
94
Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina effectively characterized the ABA’s
ability-to-assist-counsel prong of the double-prong test as requiring an inmate to
“suggest a particular trial strategy” or “think of new issues for counsel to raise” in order to prevail under the double-prong test. Id. at 57–58 (citing State v. Harris, 789
P.2d 60, 66 (Wash. 1990)).
95
Id. at 84. The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that Singleton was
incompetent under the single-prong test as well. Id. (noting that Singleton’s disbelief that he would actually die in the electric chair was evidence that Singleton did
not understand his punishment).
96
Gordon L. Moore III, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the Executioner’s
Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1469 (1987).
97
See supra Part III.B.2.
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98

proach. However, the Court did reach a consensus on a few basic
procedures.
First, an inmate who challenges his competency to be executed
99
is entitled to some sort of evidentiary hearing.
This evidentiary
hearing must allow the inmate to present evidence on the inmate’s
100
mental state.
Second, the competency decision-maker provided by
the state must be impartial, which effectively eliminates the governor
and the executive branch from making the determination due to
101
Third, the inmate must be able to challenge
conflicting interests.
102
Although these procethe state-appointed psychiatrists’ findings.
dures may ultimately lead to a battle of the psychiatric experts, it is a
worthy price to pay to ensure that evidentiary hearings “comport with
basic fairness” by respecting the gravity of a decision that involves
103
whether to take the life of another human being.
IV. PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Panetti v.
104
Quarterman was not all that surprising. Justice Powell’s cognitive
test for competency, as outlined in Ford, failed to resolve the question
of what constituted mental competence and what information might
105
Panetti’s standby
be relevant to a competency determination.
counsel framed the issue in the case as follows:
Does the Eighth Amendment permit the execution of a death row
inmate who has a factual awareness of the reason for his execution but who, because of severe mental illness, has a delusional
belief as to why the State is executing him, and thus does not understand that his execution is intended to seek retribution for his
capital crime? 106

In the months leading up to the case, the ABA adopted a resolution
previously adopted by the American Psychiatric Association, the
98

See supra Part III.B.3.
Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 167.
100
Moore, supra note 96, at 1470.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Moore,
supra note 96, at 1478.
104
127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
105
See Mark Hansen, A Death Sentence Is Brought to Mind, A.B.A. J. EREPORT,
Apr. 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/a_death_sentence_is_brought_
to_mind (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
106
Brief for Petitioner at ii, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 066407).
99
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American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance of the
Mentally Ill, which urged all states that instituted capital punishment
to adopt a competency standard that required an inmate to rationally
107
Panetti should be viewed
understand the reason for the execution.
as a substantial step in the Court’s modernization and clarification of
its competency-to-be-executed jurisprudence because the Court acknowledged that an inmate’s delusional beliefs, and therefore rational understanding, of the punishment is relevant to a competency
108
determination.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1992, Scott Panetti, dressed in camouflage, broke into his estranged wife’s house and, in front of his wife and daughter, killed his
109
parents-in-law.
Panetti was tried for capital murder in 1995 in a
110
The state trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation,
Texas court.
and it determined that Panetti “suffered from a fragmented personal111
ity, delusions, and hallucinations.”
Although it was also revealed
that Panetti had been hospitalized several times in the past for delusional behavior, the court found Panetti competent to stand trial and
112
Throughout the trial, Panetti
he was allowed to represent himself.
exhibited what his standby counsel referred to as “bizarre” behavior,
characterized by “irrational” and sometimes “incomprehensible”
113
Panetti attempted to subpoena a variety of individuals
ramblings.
114
He was
at trial, including John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus.
115
found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death.
107

American Bar Ass’n, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons
with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REV. 668, 675 (2006). The
ABA summarized its recommendation:
The underlying point here is that the retributive purpose of capital
punishment is not served by executing an offender who lacks a meaningful understanding that the state is taking his life in order to hold
him accountable for taking the life of one or more people. Holding a
person accountable is intended to be an affirmation of personal responsibility. Executing someone who lacks a meaningful understanding
of the nature of this awesome punishment and its retributive purpose
offends the concept of personal responsibility rather than affirming it.
Id. at 676.
108
See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861–62.
109
Id. at 2848.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 106, at 11.
114
Id. at 11–12.
115
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.
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After Panetti was denied relief on appeal, he filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
116
the Western District of Texas.
Panetti challenged, among other
117
things, his competency to stand trial and waive counsel.
These
challenges were unsuccessful, and, in October 2003, Panetti’s execu118
In December 2003, Panetti’s
tion date was set by the Texas court.
standby counsel filed a motion with the state court under a Texas
119
120
statute, claiming that Panetti was incompetent to be executed.
After the trial judge denied the motion without a hearing and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful, Panetti filed his second petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, challenging his
121
competency to be executed.
At the time of Panetti’s second habeas filing, the state court already had Panetti’s renewed motion to determine his competency to
be executed, in which Panetti submitted evidence that contained the
opinions of a psychologist and a law professor, both concluding that
122
The state
Panetti did not understand the reason for his execution.
court appointed two mental health experts to assess Panetti’s condi123
tion.
The two mental health experts concluded that Panetti knew
that he was going to be executed, the reason for his execution, and
124
that his execution would result in his death. Based on the state experts’ reports, and without any indication that Panetti’s evidence was
considered, the trial court concluded that Panetti was competent to
125
be executed and closed the case.
Panetti returned to the federal district court, seeking a resolu126
tion of his second habeas corpus petition.
The district court
granted Panetti an evidentiary hearing to determine his competency
127
to be executed. On September 29, 2004, the court denied Panetti’s

116

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2001).
120
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 2850.
123
Id. “If the trial court determines that the defendant has made a substantial
showing of incompetency, the court shall order at least two mental health experts to
examine the defendant . . . to determine whether the defendant is incompetent to be
executed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05(f) (Vernon 2001).
124
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2851.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
117
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habeas corpus petition based on the hearing. The court concluded
that, under the Fifth Circuit competency test, Panetti failed to dem129
onstrate incompetency to prevent his execution. After the court of
130
appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Court’s Reasoning
1.

Procedural Due Process

After first concluding that the Court had jurisdiction to review
131
Panetti’s petition, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed Panetti’s first claim that the Texas state court deprived him of
132
his procedural due process rights in light of Ford. The Court stated
that because Panetti made a “substantial showing of incompetency,”
133
The majority expressly
he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
adopted Justice Powell’s minimum procedural requirements for
competency determinations as outlined in Ford, concluding that an
inmate who has made the requisite initial showing of incompetence is
entitled to an “opportunity to be heard,” which includes submitting
evidence and argument to challenge the evidence presented by the
134
state-appointed psychiatrists.
The majority determined that Panetti made a “substantial
135
threshold showing of insanity” when he filed his renewed motion,
which contained the opinion of two experts that Panetti was not
136
competent to be executed.
Justice Kennedy asserted that Panetti
was denied his procedural due process rights because the state court
denied him an opportunity to be heard, which is required after the
137
defendant makes the requisite showing of insanity. Panetti was un128

Id.
Id. at 2852. The Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed requires that
a prisoner know “no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual
predicate for the execution.” Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex.
2004).
130
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2852.
131
The majority concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act’s (AEDPA) prohibition on successive habeas petitions did not apply to a Fordbased competency challenge when the first habeas claim was ripe for adjudication.
Id. at 2855.
132
Id. at 2855.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 2856 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part)).
135
Id. (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
136
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856.
137
Id. at 2857.
129
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able to submit contrary medical evidence, and the state court made
its determination on his competence “solely on the basis of the ex138
aminations performed by the [state-appointed] psychiatrists.”
2.

Incorporation of Rational Understanding into
Competency Determination

The Court next addressed Panetti’s claim that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of a mentally ill prisoner whose
delusions deprive him of the mental capacity to understand that his
139
In order to analyze this
execution is punishment for his crime.
claim, Justice Kennedy characterized Panetti’s mental state at the
time of his competency challenge, noting that Panetti suffered from
the delusional belief that the state’s real reason for executing him is
140
to prevent him from preaching.
Justice Kennedy characterized the
court of appeals’s relevant findings as to Panetti’s competency:
“[F]irst, petitioner is aware that he committed the murders; second,
he is aware that he will be executed; and, third, he is aware that the
reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the
141
crimes in question.”
The majority held that the court of appeals impermissibly ended
its factual inquiry by concluding that Panetti was aware of the reason
142
for his execution based on the presence of those three facts.
Justice Kennedy articulated that the Fifth Circuit test foreclosed an inquiry into Panetti’s delusional state of mind and ultimately his rational understanding of the reason for his execution, because the
circuit court concluded that “rational understanding” and “aware143
The Court rejected the narrow Fifth
ness” are not synonymous.
Circuit test and stated that Ford did not foreclose an inquiry into an
144
inmate’s rational understanding of the reason for his execution.
Justice Kennedy asserted that there is no indication that Justice Powell’s cognitive test in Ford treated delusions as irrelevant to the ques145
The Court
tion of an inmate’s “awareness” or “comprehension.”
summarized its holding, “[i]t is . . . error to derive from Ford, and the
substantive standard for incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id.
Id. at 2859.
Id.
Id. at 2860.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860.
Id. For a summary of the Fifth Circuit test, see supra note 129.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861.
Id.
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strict test for competency that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant
once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the link between
146
his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.”
The Court questioned the retributive value of executing an inmate whose perception of the crime and punishment has virtually no
147
similarities with those shared by the community.
Justice Kennedy
noted that an inmate with a distorted perception of the reason for
the execution fails to recognize the severity of the crime, which prevents the victim’s surviving family and friends from believing that
148
death is the proper punishment.
The majority recognized the implications of broadening the test
for competency. Justice Kennedy noted that more inmates will, based
on the Court’s holding, challenge their competency to be exe149
cuted. However, Justice Kennedy asserted that an inmate’s lack of a
rational understanding of the reason for the execution would not
render the inmate incompetent to face execution if the inmate is “so
callous as to be unrepentant,” “so self-centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt,” or “so adept in transferring
150
blame to others as to be considered . . . out of touch with reality.”
The Court attempted to silence critics of expanding the competency
test, stating that “[t]he beginning of doubt about competence in a
case like petitioner’s is not a misanthropic personality or an amoral
151
character. It is a psychotic disorder.”
Based on the Court’s adoption of a rational understanding component into the competency-to-face-execution test, the majority concluded that Panetti’s evidence regarding his delusional state of mind
152
Although the
should have been considered by the district court.
Court expressly rejected the narrow Fifth Circuit competency test, the
Court declined to outline a specific competency test for the courts to
153
However, Justice Kennedy noted that, on remand, the
implement.
district court should consider the evidence of both Panetti’s and the
154
state’s physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts.

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 2862.
Id. at 2861.
Id.
Id. at 2862.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2863.
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C. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority regarding whether
Panetti was denied constitutionally mandated procedures for a competency determination and the majority’s approach to creating a new
155
substantive competency-to-be-executed test.
The dissent first argued that Panetti failed to make the requisite showing of incompetence necessary to even trigger the procedural competency mandates
implicit in Ford because Panetti’s renewed motion failed to include
medical records, sworn testimony from a medical professional, or a
156
mental health diagnosis.
Even conceding that Panetti made the requisite showing, Justice
Thomas concluded that Panetti received the necessary procedures for
157
his competency determination as outlined by Justice Powell in Ford.
Justice Thomas contended that Panetti was entitled to a competency
determination made by an impartial board in which Panetti had the
opportunity to submit contrary medical evidence to that of the state158
The dissent noted that Panetti’s compeappointed psychiatrists.
tency determination was made by the state court, which satisfies the
159
requirement of impartiality.
With regard to the opportunity to
challenge the state’s own psychiatric examination, Justice Thomas
stated that the majority failed to highlight the fact that Panetti submitted a seventeen-page brief objecting to the state-appointed psychiatrists’ reports and that the state court informed Panetti that he
160
Justice Thomas indihad the right to submit additional evidence.
cated that the state’s order concerning Panetti’s competency only referred to the state’s report because the state’s evidence was persuasive
161
while Panetti’s was unpersuasive.
Justice Thomas declined to consider whether the majority’s substantive standard for competency determinations was proper but re162
jected the Court’s approach to creating a new standard.
Justice
Thomas asserted that Ford concerned actual knowledge as opposed to
rational understanding and that there was no indication in Justice
Powell’s concurrence in Ford that awareness is synonymous with ra155

Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also contended that Panetti’s successive habeas petition should be dismissed under AEDPA. Id.
156
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2868.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 2869.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 2870.
161
Id.
162
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2873.
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163

tional understanding.
The dissent contended that the majority
took unconstitutional liberties with the language in Ford while failing
164
to adhere to the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
V. EFFECTS OF PANETTI
A. Broadening of “Awareness” in the Competency Test
At first glance, the Court seems to have simply repeated a previous course of conduct in Ford by declining to outline a substantive
competency-to-face-execution standard. However, by broadening the
considerations and evidence, a court can take into account when
making a competency determination, the majority took a significant
step in modernizing its competency jurisprudence. Prior to the decision in Panetti, the law arguably afforded less protection to individuals
who challenged their competency to face execution than it did for
165
those who challenged their competency prior to trial.
Whether or
not Justice Powell intended for the single-prong test announced in
Ford to require no more than an inmate’s factual awareness of the
reason for the inmate’s execution, a majority of states narrowly inter166
preted the single-prong test in this manner.
Panetti effectively recognizes that although an inmate may be
cognitively aware of the state’s pronounced reason for seeking death,
the inmate may not be able to internally rationalize the stated reason
167
due to a mental illness.
There was no dispute that Panetti was factually aware that Texas wanted to execute him for murdering his par168
However, Panetti’s delusional state of mind “preents-in-law.
vent[ed] him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the
169
punishment to which he ha[d] been sentenced.”
In Ford, both Justice Marshall and Justice Powell recognized the
important role retribution plays in the institution of capital punish-

163

Id.
Id. at 2874.
165
See Greenhouse, supra note 6.
166
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
167
See Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty,
and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 257, 270–71 (2007) (“[P]sychotic decompensation associated with severe mental illness can leave such a formal understanding intact, while erasing or distorting a person’s ability to recognize the meaning and significance of his behavior and the behavior of others.”).
168
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2859 (2007) (majority opinion).
169
Id. at 2862.
164
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170

ment. Therefore, when viewed in terms of retribution, Panetti logically evolves from Ford by affirming the principle that there is little to
no societal value in executing a person who, due to a serious mental
disorder, has a distorted perception of the reason for punishment.
B. Invariable Increase in the Number of Competency Challenges
In her partial concurrence in Ford, Justice O’Connor expressed
concern over the fact that, as a result of the Court’s conclusion that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of the mentally incompetent, inmates could repeatedly challenge their competency to
171
be executed up until the time of their execution.
With the Panetti
Court’s incorporation of rational understanding into the substantive
competency-to-be-executed test, Justice O’Connor’s concern is even
more pervasive because inmates have wider latitude to challenge
their competency. The Panetti Court did its best to defuse this concern by noting that a “psychotic disorder,” not a “misanthropic per172
sonality,” is the basis for a competency challenge.
The obvious purpose of this statement is to drastically limit the
types of mental illnesses that could possibly provide a basis for a
competency challenge. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR),
173
classifies 297 mental disorders, ranging from “antisocial personality
174
175
disorder” to “trichotillomania.” Clearly, the Court’s classification
of a mental illness that deprives the inmate of a rational understanding of the reason for the punishment excludes a substantial number
176
of the DSM-IV-TR’s mental disorders.
By requiring a mental problem along the lines of a “psychotic
disorder,” the Court attempted to establish a clearer rule for deter170

Ford, 477 U.S. at 409 (majority opinion); id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in

part).
171

Id. at 429 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
173
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS—TEXT REVISION (4th ed. 2000). The DSM-IV-TR is the leading
guidebook on psychiatric disorders. W. John Thomas et al., Race, Juvenile Justice, and
Mental Health: New Dimensions in Measuring Pervasive Bias, 89 NW. J. CRIM. L. & CRIM.
615, 643 (1999).
174
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 685. Antisocial personality disorder is defined as “a pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.”
Id.
175
Id. at 674. Trichotillomania is categorized by “the recurrent pulling out of
one’s own hair that results in noticeable hair loss.” Id.
176
See Mark Hansen, Mentally Ill Death Row Inmates Get Another Chance, A.B.A. J.
EREPORT, July 6, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jy6panetti.html.
172
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mining when there is a sufficient basis for an inmate’s competency
challenge while at the same time avoiding tying its hands to a select
number of mental disorders. However, not even the most cleverly
crafted medical phrase, such as “psychotic disorder,” can save the
Court from opening the competency challenge floodgates. Advances
in modern behavioral science continue to demonstrate that behavior
is a “complex phenomenon,” which will certainly give rise to an increasing number of mental conditions that possibly qualify for Eighth
177
Nevertheless, the benefit
Amendment protection from execution.
of ensuring that no incompetent inmate is put to death far outweighs
any judicial economy concerns. The vindication of an inmate’s constitutional rights requires the judicial system to tolerate delays in carrying out executions because the issue at stake is literally one of life
178
or death.
C. Continued Procedural Missteps
In the twenty-one years since Ford was decided, Panetti is evidence that the Texas state courts continue to deny inmates who challenge their competency to be executed their procedural due process
rights. Arguably one of the clearest holdings in Ford is that an inmate
who challenges his competency is entitled to an opportunity to be
heard, which includes the submission of contrary medical evidence to
179
The Panetti Court noted
that of the state-appointed psychiatrists.
that the Texas state court committed an “impermissible” error by de180
nying Panetti these procedures. If states were unsure as to the constitutionality of their competency-to-be-executed procedures after
Ford, Panetti provides enough of an incentive for states to correct their
constitutionally deficient procedures.

177

Steven K. Erickson, Minding Moral Responsibility 12 (Yale University Working
Paper Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008863.
178
See Harding, supra note 81, at 141. Of course, there is not unanimous support
for this position. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State,
and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 399–400 (1962) (noting that the
prohibition against executing the incompetent precludes any judicial finality on the
issue of an inmate’s competence because an inmate’s competence can change after a
previous competence determination).
179
Ebert, supra note 78, at 34.
180
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2857 (2007).
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VI. CRAFTING A COMPETENCY-TO-BE-EXECUTED TEST

181

Although the Panetti Court concluded that Ford does not preclude an inquiry into an inmate’s rational understanding of the reason for the state’s decision to impose execution, the Court expressly
declined to articulate a competency-to-be-executed test for district
182
courts to implement.
To construct a competency test, it is important to be cognizant of one underlying consideration raised by Justice
Kennedy: an inmate’s competence raises an issue as to whether the
inmate rationally understands the reason for execution only if there
183
With this in mind, courts
is evidence of a “psychotic disorder.”
should look outside the narrow area of the competency-to-beexecuted doctrine and consider the larger framework of legal competencies in general, of which the competency to be executed is merely
184
a sub-category of adjudicative competence. These other legal competency doctrines are instructive in determining the factors relevant
to a competency determination.
A. First Element: Presence of Delusional Behavior
The first prong of a competency test should determine which
inmates have a proper basis for making a competency challenge due
to a mental condition. The DSM-IV-TR categorizes nine Axis I clinical disorders as psychotic disorders: schizophrenia, schizophreniform
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, brief psychotic
disorder, shared psychotic disorder, psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition, substance-induced psychotic disorder, and
185
psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.
Schizophrenia, the
most common psychotic disorder on the list, is categorized by severe
181

Part VI addresses the incorporation of “rational understanding” into the competency-to-be-executed framework. An inmate who lacks a factual understanding of
the reason for execution is still incompetent under Panetti. The Court acknowledged
that the competency inquiry does not end simply because an inmate has cognitive
awareness of the reason for execution. See id. at 2862 (noting that an inmate who
can identify the factual basis for the state’s reason for execution is not foreclosed
from challenging his competency).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1382–83 (2006). Adjudicative competence
includes all relevant competency determinations in the criminal context, including
pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel. Id. at 1383. The competency to
contract, to execute a will, and to consent to medical research are just a few of the
legal competencies, along with adjudicative competence, that make up the framework of legal competencies. Id. at 1382.
185
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 297.
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distortions to a person’s thinking and behavior that even compro186
mises the individual’s ability to care for himself.
The DSM-IV-TR’s use of the word “psychotic” is meant to denote
individuals who exhibit symptoms including hallucinations, delusions, disorganized speech, or grossly disorganized or catatonic be187
havior.
Delusions and hallucinations affect an individual’s method
of rationalizing his environment, which includes “the motives and
188
meanings of others’ behavior.” Individuals with schizophrenia may
189
be unable, at times, to distinguish delusions from reality. In Panetti,
Justice Kennedy concluded that Panetti’s delusion—that is, his belief
that Texas’s actual motivation to execute him was to prevent him
from preaching—was relevant to a consideration of whether Panetti
190
Delusions
rationally understood the reason for his punishment.
191
cross the line from being acceptable beliefs to unacceptable beliefs.
Therefore, a component of a competency-to-be-executed test must
examine whether the type of delusional behavior exhibited by Panetti
exists.
Courts have attempted to define what constitutes a delusion for
purposes of other competency determinations. These definitions are
generally synonymous with the DSM-IV-TR’s discussion of delusional
192
behavior. For example, in In re Estate of Scott, the California court
addressed delusional behavior in the context of the competency to
193
execute a will.
The plaintiff widower husband claimed that his deceased wife was delusional at the time she executed her will, believing
that her husband was unfaithful and that her husband was trying to
194
poison her. The court articulated a definition of a delusion:
If the belief or opinion has no basis in reason or probability, and
is without any evidence in its support, but exists without any process of reasoning, or is the spontaneous offspring of a perverted
imagination, and is adhered to against all evidence and argument,
the delusion may be truly called insane; but if there is any evi-

186

Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 368 (2006).
187
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 297–98.
188
Ryan & Berson, supra note 186, at 366.
189
Honberg, supra note 3, at 1161.
190
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2862 (2007).
191
Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 962 (1991).
192
60 P. 527 (Cal. 1900).
193
Id. at 528.
194
Id. at 529.
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dence, however slight or inconclusive, which might have a ten195
dency to create the belief, it cannot be said to be a delusion.

This definition of delusion distinguishes beliefs that have no evidentiary basis whatsoever from beliefs which might have a factual basis.
In other words, patent falsehoods form the basis for delusional beliefs
196
and behavior.
The first element to a proper competency-to-be-executed test
need not—although it certainly would aid in the competency determination process—require a finding of a DSM-IV-TR Axis I psychotic
disorder. Rather, the question should be whether there is a disconnect between the defendant’s “reality” and the actual world due to
the presence of a delusional state of mind that potentially precludes
the defendant from rationally perceiving and understanding the
state’s rationale for choosing execution as punishment for the underlying crime.
B. Second Element: Capacity to Rationalize
Having determined that a competency-to-be-executed test must
first determine whether the defendant’s behavior and current mental
state is sufficient to make a competency challenge, the next consideration is whether the defendant satisfies the ever-elusive rational
understanding standard. It goes without saying that rational understanding is, in some form, a component of other legal competency
doctrines. In the realm of the competency-to-stand-trial doctrine, the
question is whether the defendant rationally understands his interactions with his attorney and whether the defendant rationally, as well
197
The
as factually, understands the legal proceedings against him.
competency-to-make-medical-decisions framework asks whether the
patient can effectively reason and understand the health procedure
198
With regard to the insanity defense, most state jurisdicat issue.
tions allowing the defense use a definition of criminal insanity de199
rived from the M’Naghten test.
A defendant has a defense to

195

Id. at 528–29.
Saks, supra note 191, at 963.
197
Maroney, supra note 184, at 1385–86.
198
Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REV. 995,
1038 (1991).
199
Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity
Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 NW. J. CRIM. L.
& CRIM. 713, 716 (2003). See, e.g., State v. McGhee, 742 N.W.2d 497, 669 (Neb. 2007)
(noting that Nebraska follows the M’Naghten test) and State v. McLaughlin, 725
196
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criminal liability under the M’Naghten test if the defendant, at the
time the act was committed, did not know: (1) “the nature and qual200
ity of the act he was doing”; or (2) that the act was morally wrong.
This second prong of the insanity defense effectively incorporates a
rational understanding component into a determination of legal cul201
pability.
The common thread that weaves these various legal competency
doctrines together is an analysis of whether the defendant possesses
sufficient mental capabilities for comprehension and reasoning in
order to understand the circumstances surrounding the underlying
decision, crime, legal proceedings, and so on. In the criminal law
context, in general, the decision to mitigate a defendant’s blame or
punishment is a product of the belief that the defendant should not
be responsible unless the defendant possesses “a reasonable capacity
202
As Justice Kennedy noted, punishment serves no
for rationality.”
proper purpose when, due to gross delusions, there is a disconnect
203
The second prong of the
between the crime and punishment.
competency-to-be-executed test must inquire whether the inmate
possesses a reasonable capacity for rationality in order to comprehend and reason, independently of the mental disorder, through the
state’s rationale for deciding that the inmate will be executed.
This definition of rationality highlights the shortcomings of and
204
expands on Supreme Court precedent. In Rees v. Peyton, the Court
addressed the role of competence and rational understanding in the
context of whether a defendant could direct his counsel to terminate
205
post-conviction proceedings. The Court stated that the lower court
on remand should determine whether the inmate had the “capacity
to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand
whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect
206
The
which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”
Rees test essentially deems a prisoner rational for purposes of abanN.W.2d 703, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2007) (noting that defendants who plead insanity in
Minnesota must meet the M’Naghten standard).
200
Peter Western, The Supreme Court’s Bout with Insanity: Clark v. Arizona, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 143 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
201
Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 289, 294–95 (2003).
202
Id. at 294.
203
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2862 (2007).
204
384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).
205
Id. at 313.
206
Id. at 314.
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doning further litigation if the prisoner’s decision was not attribut207
able to a mental disorder. In most circumstances involving the termination of post-conviction litigation, courts find inmates competent
under the Rees test because, generally, inmates understand that the
result of abandoning further litigation will be execution, which con208
stitutes rational choice under the test.
There are two related problems with applying the Rees test’s
definition of rationality in creating a competency-to-be-executed test.
First, Panetti adopted a significantly broader interpretation of rational
209
understanding than had previously been recognized. To the extent
that Rees only requires an awareness that execution will occur if further litigation is foregone, in order to find the existence of rational
choice, this is inconsistent with Panetti. Second, the Rees test fails to
210
adequately address the prisoner’s stated reason for wanting death.
As long as an inmate can proffer a seemingly rational reason for
abandoning further litigation, courts generally will not dig deeper to
determine if a mental disorder is substantially limiting the inmate’s
211
thought process. Panetti expressly rejected this approach to analyzing an inmate’s rational understanding by stating that delusions can
severely distort an inmate’s perception of reality so as to render the
212
After Panetti, an inmate is no longer preinmate incompetent.
cluded from challenging his competence to be executed merely because the inmate appears to have a rational understanding of the
213
The Rees test is analogous to
state’s reason for seeking execution.
the limited Fifth Circuit competency-to-be-executed test that the
Court ultimately rejected in Panetti because both tests assume that a
prisoner who appears rational at times is therefore rational for purposes of competence determinations.

207

See Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187 (2005).
208
Id. at 1186. See, e.g., Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 613, 617 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that the inmate was competent to abandon post-conviction relief because he thought further litigation would be fruitless, despite believing that after
death he would be part of a “Holy Trinity” with God, that he had many concubines
and children in various parts of the world that he had visited while in prison, and
that he had once visited heaven).
209
See Bonnie, supra note 207, at 1186 (noting that a prisoner’s awareness of the
state’s reason for seeking death is not the same as a rational understanding of that
reason).
210
Id. at 1188.
211
Id.
212
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2863 (2007).
213
Id. at 2862.
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The definition of rationality proposed here, unlike in the Rees
test, takes into account the reality that an inmate’s mental condition
can significantly affect a seemingly rational thought process. For ex214
ample, consider an inmate convicted of murder in Texas who, at all
times after his trial, including while awaiting execution, suffered from
schizophrenia, although it was not properly diagnosed until after
trial. Assume the following: (1) the inmate knows that the state is
seeking his death for his crime; (2) the inmate does feel and exhibit
remorse for his crime; (3) the inmate exhibits delusional behavior at
times, believing that he must sacrifice his life to the state for the state
to release his family from captivity; and (4) the inmate’s remorse is
actually an attempt to appear competent in order to face execution
in order to further his delusional belief.
Under the Rees test, if the inmate chose to abandon postconviction relief, the inmate would probably be deemed competent
to make this decision because the court would conclude that the inmate made the rational choice to do so out of remorse. In other
words, the court would probably not assess the degree to which the
delusional behavior affected the inmate’s seemingly rational and
genuine feelings of remorse. Now assume the aforementioned facts,
except that instead of believing that he must sacrifice himself to save
his family, the inmate does not want to die, and he believes that the
state actually wants to execute him to prevent him from becoming
“ruler of the world.” The definition of rationality proposed here asks
whether the inmate possesses a sufficient capacity for rationality in
order to comprehend and reason, independently of the mental disorder, through the state’s reason for seeking execution. If the inmate challenged his competency to be executed under this definition
of rationality, the inmate would probably not be competent to be
executed. The inmate’s delusional beliefs compromise his rationality
to the point where his reality is severely distorted.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took a significant step in expanding its
competency-to-be-executed jurisprudence in Panetti by affirming the
principle that an inmate who does not possess a rational understanding of the state’s reason for execution is incompetent to be executed
under the Eighth Amendment. By recognizing that an inmate’s delusions are relevant to a competency determination, the Court rejected
214

This example is not intended to suggest that the test for the competency to be
executed should be the same as the test for the competency to abandon postconviction relief.
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a narrow interpretation of competency derived from Ford and left it
to district courts to determine what constitutes rational understanding. In order to craft a competency test based on the Court’s rationale in Panetti, courts should look outside the narrow framework of
competency to be executed. The other areas of legal competencies
are instructive for purposes of analyzing what criteria are relevant to a
substantive competency test.

